Overview and Assessment of
Approaches to Access Enforcement

2001-FCY-8E

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FOREIGN LEGAL MODELS AND COURT-BASED PROGRAMS

This section discusses what lessons can be drawn from the experiences of other jurisdictions that would be helpful in developing Canadian programs and legislation in the area of access.

United States

The United States has not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, and constitutionally protected parental rights limit the ability of states to refuse, restrict or terminate access. In Santosky v. Kramer, the U.S. Supreme Court held that constitutional due process requires that a "clear and convincing" evidence standard be applied in an action to terminate parental rights on the basis that the child has been "permanently neglected,"⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ and the same requirement has been applied in private law cases. In Mullin v. Phelps, for example, the Vermont Supreme Court held that although proof of sexual abuse could lead to a change in custody, it could not result in a complete denial of access unless the standard of proof required in a parental termination case was met--that is, unless the sexual abuse was proved by "clear and convincing" evidence.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾ The Louisiana Supreme Court reached the same conclusion and declared unconstitutional a statute that required a court, upon a finding that a parent had sexually abused his or her child, to terminate access. The court did so because the statute did not expressly require a standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence as a basis for mandatory termination of an allegedly abusive parent's access rights.⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ The Court concluded that failure to require proof of sexual abuse of the child by the parent by clear and convincing evidence rendered it unconstitutional because it violated the parent's procedural due process rights. "Until the state proves sexual abuse in a fact-finding hearing that provides procedural due process, the parent and the child presumably have a shared interest in preventing the erroneous destruction of the family relationship."⁽¹⁷⁸⁾

Several American states have adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provision, which states that "a parent not granted custody of the child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental, moral, or emotional health."⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ The express purpose of this provision is to modify the best interests of the child rule by placing a stricter burden on the court and on the custodial parent seeking to curtail access, and to prevent courts from denying access on the basis of "irrelevant moral judgments" about the parent's behaviour.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ Even in states that have a statutory best interests of the child test for determining access, courts have refused to deny parental access absent evidence of harm to the child.⁽¹⁸¹⁾ The strong presumption in favour of access unless it is clearly proven that it would put the child at risk of harm is inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child requirement that access be determined according to the best interests of the child.

Michigan, which has given substantial attention to the issues of access (called "parenting time") and access enforcement, has adopted a strong presumption that it is in the best interests of the child to have a strong relationship with both parents. Its Child Custody Act provides that the child has a right to access unless it is proven by "clear and convincing evidence" that it would endanger the child's physical, mental or emotional health.⁽¹⁸²⁾ The specific factors to be considered when determining custody and access are set out below. Of particular interest are the specific provisions related to violence and abuse that Michigan has incorporated into its Child Custody Act.

First, access to a child conceived as a result of criminal sexual conduct may not be awarded to the convicted parent. The prohibition does not apply when, after the conviction, the parents cohabit and care for the child together, or when the conviction was based solely on the victim being between 13 and 16 years old.⁽¹⁸³⁾ Also, a parent convicted of criminal sexual conduct with his or her own child may not be granted access to the child or a sibling unless the other parent and the child or sibling consent.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ In almost all other cases, access will be ordered.

Michigan's Child Custody Act sets out a list of factors to be considered when determining which custody and access orders are in the best interests of the child:

1. The love, affective, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child.
   
   
2. The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child to his or her religion or creed, if any.
   
   
3. The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
   
   
4. The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
   
   
5. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
   
   
6. The moral fitness of the parties involved.
   
   
7. The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
   
   
8. The home, school, and community record of the child.
   
   
9. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court considers the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
   
   
10. The willingness and ability of each of the parties to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent or the child and the parents.
    
    
11. Domestic violence, regardless of whether the violence was directed against or witnessed by the child.
    
    
12. Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.⁽¹⁸⁵⁾

The child's opinion is listed as one factor to consider when determining the best interest of the child,⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ and children of sufficient age to express preference have a statutory right to express their views during the investigation that is conducted into every disputed custody and access case.⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ However, the child's opinion is not accorded strong weight, even when the child is mature and capable, if it would result in access being cut off.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

Michigan's statute also says that the court may consider the following factors when deciding the frequency, duration and type of parenting time (access):

1. The existence of any special circumstances or needs of the child.
   
   
2. Whether the child is a nursing child less than 6 months of age, or less than 1 year of age if the child receives substantial nutrition through nursing.
   
   
3. The reasonable likelihood of abuse or neglect of the child during parenting time.
   
   
4. The reasonable likelihood of abuse of a parent resulting from the exercise of parenting time.
   
   
5. The inconvenience to, and burdensome impact or effect on, the child of travelling for purposes of parenting time.
   
   
6. Whether a parent can reasonably be expected to exercise parenting time in accordance with the court order.
   
   
7. Whether a parent has frequently failed to exercise reasonable parenting time.
   
   
8. The threatened or actual detention of the child with the intent to retain or conceal the child from the other parent or from a third person who has legal custody. A custodial parent's temporary residence with the child in a domestic violence shelter shall not be construed as evidence of the custodial parent's intent to retain or conceal the child from the other parent.
   
   
9. Any other relevant factors.⁽¹⁸⁹⁾

The likelihood of abuse of the child or a parent is a factor to be considered when determining the frequency, duration and type of access (factors c) and d)). Supervised access may be ordered to protect the child from parental violence (Michigan, 2000a: 4-14). However, there are not enough supervised access facilities in Michigan, raising questions about whether or not children are adequately protected.⁽¹⁹⁰⁾

Across the U.S., non-custodial parents may be subject to restrictions on their access to protect the child. In all jurisdictions, supervised access is commonly ordered when there has been sexual or other physical abuse (Tortorella, 1996: 9). It may also be ordered when the non-custodial parent has no existing relationship with the child, lacks parenting skills, suffers mental illness, abuses substances, presents a risk of abduction or has been violent, or when the custodial parent has denied access (Strauss,1995: 229; Pearson & Thoennes, 2000: 124).

Preventive and alternative measures have been adopted across the U.S. with varying degrees of success. In 1998, Geasler and Blaisure surveyed parental education programs across the country and found that "the popularity and complexity of programs for divorcing parents continues to grow" but only a small percentage have conducted any type of evaluation (Geasler & Blaisure, 1999: 56, 60). Michigan's Friend of the Court, as outlined below, offers various alternative and preventive programs, including parental education.

Michigan's Friend of the Court is a statutorily created agency employed by the circuit court of each judicial circuit (there are 57 circuits).⁽¹⁹¹⁾ Created in 1919 to enforce child support in divorce cases on behalf of children who "may become public charges," the Friend of the Court program expanded its functions over the 20^th century (Michigan, 2000b: 2). The Friend of the Court program helps collect, disburse, enforce and modify child support, and now is also the investigative and enforcement entity of the circuit court for custody and parenting time (access). As well, the program is required by statute to provide mediation. It also provides ongoing case management for domestic relations actions and helps parents with their proceedings (Michigan, 2000b: 3).

Michigan has been relatively successful in enforcing child support orders. John Ferry, State Court Administrator, attributed Michigan's success to three factors:

• the Friend of the Court offices are based locally so they can respond to local conditions;
  
  
• the Friend of the Court is an extension of the Surrogate Court and has the power of the court behind it; and
  
  
• the Friend of the Court enforces parenting time orders as well as support orders (other state agencies enforce support orders only).⁽¹⁹²⁾

The Friend of the Court program generates a large number of complaints.⁽¹⁹³⁾ Ferry attributed these complaints to misunderstandings of what the Friend of the Court can do or has done and to legitimate concerns about the treatment people received from staff. Ferry noted that Friend of the Court clients are not a happy group because they are dealing with very emotional issues and are, therefore, hard to deal with themselves. He acknowledged that there is a need for more staff and for better training, and that there is a high turnover among Friend of the Court staff because it is a highly stressful job.⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ The Friend of the Court has inadequate resources, and in 1999 there was an average caseload of 459 per staff member (Michigan, 2000b: Appendix C).⁽¹⁹⁵⁾

Although the statutes and rules governing the Friend of the Court program operate across the state, the offices in the various circuits operate substantially differently (Bassett et al., 1998: 11-47). Each office must develop its own handbook to distribute to parties. The Friend of the Court Bureau at the State Court Administration Office develops a model handbook (Michigan, 1998a), which the offices then modify to reflect local practices. The Oakland County Friend of the Court office has been identified as particularly successful, and its handbook provides a practical and thorough introduction to the divorce process (Oakland, a). Attached as Appendix B to this report is an excerpt from this handbook dealing with parenting time.

The Oakland Country office developed a parental education program called Start Making it Liveable for Everyone (SMILE) about 10 years ago. SMILE is an award-winning program that has been adopted by many other Michigan county Friend of the Court offices and other states.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ Written material and a SMILE videotape are available (Oakland County, b).⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ The Oakland County Friend of the Court office is currently developing SMILE 2, a refresher parental education course for post-divorce families, which will cover issues that arise as children get older. This initiative responds to the consensus opinion of experts that "divorce is understood most appropriately as a process that unfolds over time rather than a single isolated event in a family's history" (Freeman, 1998: 85).

Two years ago, the Oakland County Friend of the Court office developed a parental education program for unmarried fathers who have never lived with or lived only briefly with the custodial mother. This program, called Forget Me Not, is aimed at educating unmarried fathers about the importance of developing and maintaining a positive relationship with their children, taking into account the fact that this client group may not have the same initial commitment to family as do those who marry, and is more likely to "disappear."⁽¹⁹⁸⁾

The Friend of the Court program emphasizes early preventive interventions. John Ferry told the Michigan members of Congress that Friend of the Court offices have made increasing use of mediation so that families can resolve their own disputes outside the adversarial process.⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ Friend of the Court offices are required by statute to provide voluntary mediation to help parties settle custody and parenting time disputes.⁽²⁰⁰⁾ A mediator who conducts formal mediation pursuant to the Friend of the Court Act may not carry out other functions of the Friend of Court.⁽²⁰¹⁾ This restriction creates a difficulty for offices that have inadequate staff, which they avoid by contracting an outside agency to provide mediation services or by using "informal" voluntary mediation. As a result the Friend of the Court mediator may carry out investigative, enforcement or referee functions.⁽²⁰²⁾

Practices of the Friend of the Court vary from county to county. Irene Sivavajchaipong, Supervisor of Investigations at the Ingham County Friend of the Court office, explained how cases are treated in her office.⁽²⁰³⁾ On intake, the office identifies cases that are likely to give rise to ongoing problems and recommends counselling or parenting programs, as appropriate. A "conciliator" meets with the parents to help them reach an agreement. The conciliator may see the children, but this is not standard practice. Conciliators recommend joint legal custody in almost all cases, unless there are serious intimidation problems, and try to maintain the status quo. When abuse is alleged, the conciliator recommends supervised access, preferably by a third-party volunteer. The Ingham County Friend of the Court office offers very limited supervision services, and there is a lack of supervised parenting time services in the county. When the parties do not reach an agreement, the conciliator makes a recommendation about custody and parenting time, to which the parties may agree. In any case, the judge almost always makes an order consistent with the recommendation. The office offers a parental education program consisting of a brochure and a video, which may be given before or after conciliation. When there are parenting time disputes after an order has been made, Ingham County uses parenting time "advocates" to enforce parenting time orders.

The Friend of the Court program is required by statute to enforce parenting time orders. When an office receives a written complaint, and staff have reason to believe that a violation of a parenting time order has occurred, the office sends a notice to the custodial parent requiring a response within 14 days. After 14 days, the Friend of the Court may 1) schedule a meeting with both parties to try to resolve the problem, 2) refer the parties to mediation if they agree, 3) proceed under the Support and Parenting Time Enforcement Act with sanctions, including make-up parenting time and contempt proceedings, or 4) petition for a variation of the parenting time provisions (Michigan, 2000a: 4-4-4-5). Informal mediation is often used by at least some Friend of the Court offices to try to resolve problems,⁽²⁰⁴⁾ and the persuasive rather than punitive approach is popular with at least some non-custodial fathers, who perceive that punitive measures simply make the custodial mother mad and do not solve the problem.⁽²⁰⁵⁾

Every circuit court in Michigan is required by statute to have a make-up parenting time policy that includes the following elements:

• the make-up parenting time must be of the same type and duration as the parenting time that was denied;
  
  
• it must take place within one year after the wrongfully denied parenting time; and
  
  
• the make-up parenting time must take place at a time chosen by the non-custodial parent.⁽²⁰⁶⁾

In order to obtain make-up time, the non-custodial parent must give the Friend of the Court office notice of denial of parenting time. Within five days of the notice, the Friend of the Court must decide if it will act and must notify the custodial parent of its decision. The custodial parent must respond within seven days. When the custodial parent contests the claim that parenting time was denied, a hearing is held before a referee (who is a member of the Friend of the Court office) or the court. When the hearing is before a referee, either party, when dissatisfied with the result, is entitled to a de novo hearing before a judge (Michigan, 2000a: 4-5).

When make-up parenting time does not help resolve a dispute and civil contempt proceedings are appropriate, the Friend of the Court office must commence such proceedings by filing a petition for an order to show cause why the parent who has violated the parenting time order should not be held in contempt. The office must give notice to the subject parent of possible sanctions and of the right to request a hearing on modification of parenting time. When the parent requests a modification within 14 days of the notice, the court must hold a hearing unless the dispute is otherwise resolved. The court may combine the modification and show cause hearings, in which case the modification hearing must be held first. The court may impose the following sanctions:

• require additional terms and conditions consistent with the parenting time order;
  
  
• modify the parenting time order to meet the best interests of the child, after notice to both parties and a hearing, when requested by a party;
  
  
• order that make-up parenting time be provided for the non-custodial parent;
  
  
• order the parent to pay a fine of not more than $100;
  
  
• commit the parent to jail for no more than 45 days for a first offence and 90 days for subsequent offences (with or without work-release privileges); or,
  
  
• condition the suspension of the parent's occupational licence, driver's licence, recreational or sporting license on non-compliance with an order for make-up and ongoing parenting time (Michigan, 2000a: 4-5, 4-6).

Outside Michigan, access orders are not enforced by state agencies but by individual parties. Tort actions are available in some American states, but have not been a particularly effective means of getting the relationship between the child and the non-custodial parent "back on track," although some commentators have supported the use of such actions (e.g., Geismann, 1993: 606-608). The few reported U.S. cases of tort claims for interference with a parent's visitation rights have had mixed results, dependent on the factual background of each case. Generally the tort actions are brought long after the event, when there is no hope of re-establishing a relationship, and such actions focus on compensation for a parent rather than on ensuring that access takes place.⁽²⁰⁷⁾ Some U.S. courts have dismissed tort actions for interference with visitation or for intentional infliction of emotional distress, reasoning that the power to punish for contempt can be used to coerce compliance with the access order, and that a tort remedy, therefore, is superfluous and, potentially, produces excessive litigation.⁽²⁰⁸⁾

Courts across the U.S. may fine or imprison custodial parents for wilful contempt of access orders, and often do so without referring to the best interests of the child.⁽²⁰⁹⁾ States differ in their approach to contempt proceedings when a child refuses access. In Michigan, the Friend of the Court of Ingham County said that access orders are not enforced when the child is 16 years of age or older and does not want to see the non-custodial parent, but that access orders are enforced, even to the point of jailing the custodial parent for contempt, when a capable child below the age of 16 refuses to comply.⁽²¹⁰⁾ Some U.S. courts have found children in contempt for refusing access (Murray, 1999). The Illinois Court of Appeals, for example, affirmed a finding of contempt against two sisters, aged 8 and 12, who adamantly refused to visit their father, but ruled that the order of incarceration be reversed and the case remanded so that alternatives to incarceration could be considered.⁽²¹¹⁾ The Court of Appeals affirmed that children could be incarcerated for contempt of a visitation order, even though they were not parties to the proceeding, but that less intrusive alternatives should be considered first.

Some courts express reluctance to imprison custodial parents for contempt when children refuse access. The North Carolina Court of Appeals set aside an order committing a custodial mother to jail for 30 days for contempt, when the child refused access, because there were no "findings that the incarceration of the plaintiff is reasonably necessary to promote and protect the best interests of the child." There was no evidence that the mother wilfully failed to comply, rather she "did everything possible short of using physical force or a threat of punishment to make the child go with his father."⁽²¹²⁾ The non-custodial father could have sought an order forcing the child to visit, but such orders should be granted

only when the circumstances are so compelling and only after he has done the following: afforded to the parties a hearing in accordance with due process; created a proper court order based on findings of fact and conclusions of law determined by the judge to justify and support the order; and made findings that include at a minimum that the drastic action of incarceration of a parent is reasonably necessary for the promotion and protection of the best interest and welfare of the child.⁽²¹³⁾

The U.S. has ratified the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and effectively implemented it.⁽²¹⁴⁾ One of the few American cases to address directly the protection of access rights under the Convention is Viragh v. Foldes.⁽²¹⁵⁾ In that case, the access father sought return of his children to Hungary or, alternatively, requested that the custodial mother be ordered to send the children to Hungary at least twice a year. The father's Hungarian access order provided for access on alternate weekends, two weeks each in July and August, and three days during the children's winter and spring holidays. The mother had relocated to the United States without informing the father beforehand.

The court rejected that father's argument that the mother's removal violated his rights of custody and determined that the father had rights of access only. The court noted that the Convention does not require mandatory return of a child to enforce rights of access, but that there is discretion to do so under article 18 of the Convention. The court further noted that article 26 provides that the parent who has removed the children from their habitual residence, and made the exercise of access rights more difficult, may be ordered to pay the necessary expenses incurred by the non-custodial parent to exercise rights of access. As well, said the court, article 21 of the Convention

recognizes that a judge may not enter a visitation order which is impractical. By instructing the judge to remove, "as far as possible," all obstacles to the exercise of access rights, the Convention emphasizes that the judge must consider all practical limitations.⁽²¹⁶⁾

With these principles in mind, the court supported the reasoning of the lower court judge who refused to allow access in Hungary because of the risk that the children would not be returned. This judge ordered two access visits a year in America with the mother to reimburse the father for his expenses. The court rejected the father's argument that the children should be returned to Hungary so that the authority there could determine the appropriate visitation order, stating that the Convention, in articles 21 and 26, "contemplates that the judicial or administrative authorities in the "requested State," or the nation in which the children currently reside, have jurisdiction over visitation matters."⁽²¹⁷⁾ Furthermore, the court rejected the father's argument that the judge should have made an access order that was a "mirror image" of the Hungarian order, stating that the Convention does not require that a mirror image visitation order be entered because such a requirement would be impractical. The court added, however, that to the extent practical the Hungarian access order should be followed during the children's stay in the United States.

The father objected that the access order was meaningless because he could not afford to travel to or live in the U.S. The court had ordered the mother to reimburse him for the expenses of exercising access in the U.S., but this order did not address his inability to purchase an airline ticket in the first place. The court remanded the case to the lower court to address that problem. The court denied the father's request for costs, stating that costs are mandated when an order for return of a child is made but not for an access order. The legal costs of enforcement may prevent impecunious access parents from pursuing a remedy. Horstmeyer commented as follows:

This case illustrates the Convention's ineffectiveness in its attempt to fashion remedies for the protection of international access rights. In this case, the non-custodial parent was financially unable to exercise his access rights in the United States. This is not surprising because salaries and the cost of living in the United States are much higher than those in many foreign nations, such as Hungary. Thus, the reimbursement arrangement was not feasible. Upon remand, the court likely will instruct Foldes to pay an initial fee for Viragh's travel and reasonable living expenses, rather than allowing her to reimburse him at the conclusion of his visit. Nevertheless, one can only wonder what the courts will do when confronted with the case of two indigent parents. In such a case, no remedy may exist. Furthermore, as in Viragh, a non-custodial parent may obtain a less favourable visitation arrangement than the original court mandated in its custody order. Such a result rewards the custodial parent for fleeing the habitual residence to limit the former spouse's access to the child. This is troublesome because the non-custodial parent may become frustrated when attempting to exercise valid access rights. This could create an incentive for even more child abductions (Horstmeyer, 1995: 184).⁽²¹⁸⁾

A more recent decision confirms that the Convention is of little assistance for parents who have only access rights. In Bromley v. Bromley, the court ruled that the Convention does not provide a remedy for violation of access rights, so the non-custodial parent must apply to state courts under domestic laws for assistance.⁽²¹⁹⁾

U.S. courts have adopted the view that a non-removal law, agreement or order creates "rights of custody" within the meaning of the Convention, so that a custodial parent who removes the child in that context will be ordered to return the child (Silberman, 1994).⁽²²⁰⁾

Attempts in the U.S. to enforce access orders against non-custodial parents have not been very successful. An order of the trial judge that a non-custodial father pay the mother $20 for each day he failed to exercise access was set aside on the grounds that the obligation of a non-custodial parent, to visit a child is only a moral and not a legal duty.⁽²²¹⁾ More promising have been various initiatives to encourage continuing involvement by the non-custodial parent through parental education programs and other preventive measures. Michigan does not enforce access orders against the non-custodial parent, but Michigan's Friend of the Court has emphasized education and counselling to encourage non-custodial fathers to maintain or develop a relationship with their children. The Forget Me Not program developed by Oakland County's Friend of the Court two years ago, discussed above, is specifically aimed at encouraging unmarried non-custodial fathers to be involved with their children.

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• ¹⁷⁵ Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).

• ¹⁷⁶ Mullin v. Phelps, 647 A.2d 714 (Vt. 1994).

• ¹⁷⁷ em>In re A.C., 643 So.2d 743 (La. 1994).

• ¹⁷⁸ Ibid. at 748.

• ¹⁷⁹ Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, section 407, 9A U.L.A. 612 (1987). This provision has been adopted verbatim in Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky and Montana: Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 750, para. 5/607(a); Kan. Stat. Ann. s 60_1616(a) (1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 403.320(1) (1994); Mont. Code Ann. s 40_4_217 (1993). Arizona's provision is similar: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 25_337 (1991) provides that a non-custodial parent is entitled to reasonable access, unless the court finds "serious endangerment" to the child's health. Missouri does not permit limits on access, unless there is a threat to the child's "physical health or emotional development": Mo. Ann. Stat. s 452.400.

• ¹⁸⁰ Uniform Divorce and Marriage Act, ibid. at 612_13.

• ¹⁸¹ See, for example, Parker v. Ford, 453 N.Y.S.2d 465 (App. Div. 1982) at 466, which the court said that "visitation is always to be premised upon a consideration of the best interests of the children... however, denying visitation to a natural parent is a drastic remedy and should only be done where there are compelling reasons... and there must be substantial evidence that such visitation is detrimental to the children's welfare."

• ¹⁸² Child Custody Act, MCLA 722.27a(3); MSA 25.312(7a)[3].

• ¹⁸³ Child Custody Act, MCLA 722.27a(4); MSA 25.312(7a)[4].

• ¹⁸⁴ Child Custody Act, MCLA 722.27a(5); MSA 25.312(7a)[5].

• ¹⁸⁵ Child Custody Act, MCLA 722.23.

• ¹⁸⁶ Child Custody Act, MCLA 722.23 (i).

• ¹⁸⁷ Child Custody Act, MCLA 722.24.

• ¹⁸⁸ Casbergue v. Casbergue, 124 Mich. App. 491, 335 NW2d 16 (1983).

• ¹⁸⁹ Child Custody Act, MCLA 722.27a (6) (7); MSA 25.312(7a) [6], [7].

• ¹⁹⁰ There was general agreement among those interviewed on April 13, 2000 at Michigan's Friend of the Court Bureau and at the Ingham County Friend of the Court office that there are not enough supervised access services in the state.

• ¹⁹¹ Friend of the Court Act, MI Statutes, Ch. 552.

• ¹⁹² John D. Ferry, State Court Administrator, presentation to the Michigan Congressional Family and Civil Law Workgroup on Friend of the Court Projects. April 13, 2000.

• ¹⁹³ In 1999, the Friend of the Court had a total caseload of 839,049, and there were 262,993 complaints about support and 132,613 complaints about custody or parenting time (Michigan, 2000b: Appendix C).

• ¹⁹⁴ John D. Ferry, State Court Administrator, presentation to the Michigan Congressional Family and Civil Law Workgroup on Friend of the Court Projects. April 13, 2000.

• ¹⁹⁵ Resource problems were mentioned by everyone interviewed who was involved in the Friend of the Court program, and stressed by John D. Ferry, State Court Administrator, in his presentation to the Michigan Congressional Family and Civil Law Workgroup on Friend of the Court Projects on April 13, 2000. Ferry explained that six years ago, Michigan obtained a five-year waiver so that it could use federal funds transferred to the states for custody and parenting time enforcement. At the end of the waiver period, the federal government refused to continue funding custody and parenting time enforcement. As a result, the Friend of Court program experienced funding cuts in 1998.

• ¹⁹⁶ Joseph G. Salamone, Oakland Country Friend of the Court. Presentation to the Michigan Congressional Family and Civil Law Workgroup on Friend of the Court Projects, April 13, 2000.

• ¹⁹⁷ A parental education video entitled Parenting Time: It's in Your Hands and a staff video entitled Making a Difference: Parenting Time and the Friend of the Court, prepared by the State Court Administrative Office of Michigan are available.

• ¹⁹⁸ Joseph G. Salamone, Oakland Country Friend of the Court. Presentation to the Michigan Congressional Family and Civil Law Workgroup on Friend of the Court Projects. April 13, 2000.

• ¹⁹⁹ John D. Ferry, State Court Administrator. Presentation to the Michigan Congressional Family and Civil Law Workgroup on Friend of the Court Projects. April 13, 2000.

• ²⁰⁰ Friend of the Court Act, s.13(1).

• ²⁰¹ Friend of the Court Act, s.15.

• ²⁰² Interview with Sharon Deja, Manager, Friend of the Court Bureau, April 13, 2000.

• ²⁰³ Interview with Irene Sivavajchaipong, April 13, 2000.

• ²⁰⁴ Interview with Irene Sivavajchaipong, Supervisor of Investigations, Ingham Country Circuit Court, Family Division. April 13, 2000.

• ²⁰⁵ Interview with Dave Whitehead, past president of Capital Area Fathers for Equal Rights and a former client of the Ingham Country Friend of the Court program, April 13, 2000. Fathers' rights groups have been active in pushing for reforms in Michigan. Currently, one group is advocating for presumptive joint physical custody. Interview with Murray Davis, Executive Director, and Eldridge Mason, Director, Public Relations of DADS of Michigan, April 13, 2000.

• ²⁰⁶ Support and Parenting Time Enforcement Act, 552.642, s.42.

• ²⁰⁷ See, for example, the first U.S. case that allowed recovery for interference with visitation rights, Ruffalo v. United States, 590 F.Supp. 760 (Mo. 1984). This case had an unusual factual background. The non-custodial mother's action against the government for interference with visitation and communication rights was upheld because her son was in the Federal Witness Protection Program.

• ²⁰⁸ See, for example, Gleiss v. Newman, 415 N.W.2d 845 (Wis. App. 1987).

• ²⁰⁹ Tangeman v. Tangeman (2000 WL 217284 (Ohio App. 2 Dist.): The custodial mother was imprisoned for three days and fined $500 in costs for contempt of visitation order); Matter of Munz and Munz, 242 A.D.2d 789, 661 N.Y.S.2d 882: custodial mother was imprisoned for 30 days for contempt of visitation order; In re Tammy D. Keaton, Relator (2000 WL 301189 (Tex.App._Amarillo)).

• ²¹⁰ Interview with Irene Sivavajchaipong, Supervisor of Investigations, Ingham County Circuit Court, Family Division, April 13, 2000.

• ²¹¹ In re Marriage of Marshall, 663 N.E.2d 1113 (Ill.App. 3 Dist.,1996).

• ²¹² Hancock v. Hancock, 471 S.E.2d 415 (N.C.App.,1996) at 419.

• ²¹³ Ibid. See also Mintz v. Mintz, 64 N.C.App. 338, 307 S.E.2d 391 (1983).

• ²¹⁴ The Convention was implemented by the federal International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 USCA s 11601 (1988).

• ²¹⁵ Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993).

• ²¹⁶ Ibid. at 249.

• ²¹⁷ Ibid. at 249.

• ²¹⁸ See also Steward (1997).

• ²¹⁹ Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F.Supp.2d 857 (Penn. U.S. Dist. Ct. 1998).

• ²²⁰ David S. v.Zamira, 151 Misc.2d 630, 574 N.Y.S.2d 429 (Fam.Ct.1991), aff'd In re Schnier, 17 F.L.R. 1237 (N.Y.App.Div.2d Dep't).

• ²²¹ Hathcock v. Hathcock, 685 So.2d 736 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).

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